Ever further from the West: why Ankara looks to Moscow by Seufert, Günter
www.ssoar.info
Ever further from the West: why Ankara looks to
Moscow
Seufert, Günter
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Stellungnahme / comment
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Seufert, G. (2017). Ever further from the West: why Ankara looks to Moscow. (SWP Comment, 2/2017). Berlin: Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. https://nbn-resolving.org/
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-50613-9
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
  Dr. Günter Seufert is a Senior Fellow in SWP’s EU / Europe Division SWP Comments 2 
  February 2017 
1 
Stiftung  
Wissenschaft und 
Politik 
German Institute  
for International and 
Security Affairs  
SW
P
 C
om
m
en
ts
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Ever Further from the West:  
Why Ankara Looks to Moscow 
Günter Seufert 
A bloody coup attempt, the government responding by dismantling the state of law 
and an unending series of terror attacks have turned Turkey into a different country. 
In foreign policy, Ankara’s rapprochement with Moscow raises the question of whether 
the West can still consider Turkey a reliable partner. Officially, the country continues 
to be a candidate for membership of the European Union. However, for some time now 
the talk has been more of the dangers that an unstable and anti-Western Turkey creates 
for the EU than of how Brussels might influence Turkish politics. NATO too is concerned 
about Turkey. Will it remain in the Western camp? Can it recover domestically? What 
sort of future do the more recent developments in foreign and domestic policy predict 
for Turkey? 
 
In the past few weeks, Turkey has seemed 
to score one foreign-policy victory after an-
other. The truce in Syria, which it negotiated 
along with Russia in the last days of 2016, 
was met with a positive reaction by the 
United Nations Security Council, emphasis-
ing once again that Turkey is key to finding 
a solution to the conflict. This strengthens 
Ankara’s position vis-à-vis the United States. 
It can now put increased pressure on Kurd-
ish organisations in Syria and Iraq, which 
have been supported by the US in fighting 
Islamic State (IS) in Syria since 2013, but 
which are also closely linked to the Kurdis-
tan Workers party (PKK). 
More Room for Manoeuvre in 
Syria and Iraq 
As part of their Euphrates Shield Operation, 
launched in August 2016, regular Turkish 
units and groups from the so-called Free 
Syrian Army have driven IS fighters from 
a band of territory in northern Syria some 
40 km wide. On 28 and 29 December, Turk-
ish ground troops directly cooperated with 
the Russian air force for the first time, 
demonstrating to the US that Turkey has an 
alternative to American air support. At the 
same time, the Turkish government floated 
the idea of barring the US from using its 
Incirlik military base because the US cooper-
ates with the Kurdish-Syrian militias of the 
PKK-affiliated Democratic Union Party (PYD) 
in Syria. Both of these moves drive up the 
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price that Washington would have to pay 
if it allowed the Kurdish-Syrian militias to 
unite the areas they control in northern 
Syria and thus build a “Kurdish corridor” 
on Turkey’s southern border. 
During his visit to Iraq on 6 and 7 Janu-
ary 2017, Turkish Prime Minister Binali 
Yıldırım promised to withdraw Turkish 
units from Baschiqa, west of Mosul. This 
had been a longstanding demand of the 
Iraqi government. Yıldırım also confirmed 
the territorial integrity of Iraq, which Turk-
ish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had 
repeatedly called into question in 2016 
by referring to former possessions of the 
Ottoman Empire and the right to autonomy 
of Iraq’s Turkmen. Yıldırım’s concessions 
have secured a promise from the Iraqi gov-
ernment to take action against PKK fighters 
in its Sinjar Mountains. The PKK has drawn 
on a local ethnic group in that mountain-
ous region, the Kurdish Yazidis, to form its 
own militias. 
Turkey’s Middle East policy: 
A Grand Design ... 
Given the awkward situation that Turkey 
has created for itself in the Middle East, its 
rapprochement with Moscow comes as no 
surprise. Whilst in 2011 Turkey was still 
being praised by the West as a model for 
the future of the Islamic world, the Arab 
Spring has now turned the reference points 
of Turkey’s foreign policy upside down. 
Until then, the country had successfully 
reconciled Islamic identity and democracy. 
Moreover, it acted as a credible mediator 
in the Middle East who was seen as being 
above the political, ethnic, religious and 
denominational rifts that crisscross the 
region. In those years, Turkey normalised 
its relationship with Kurdistan-Iraq, had 
good relations with both Sunnis and Shiites 
in Iraq, mediated between Syria and Israel, 
and reached a compromise deal on Iran’s 
nuclear programme in tandem with Brazil 
(whose implementation has admittedly 
floundered because of US opposition). 
The Arab Spring torpedoed Turkey’s 
strategy of finding common ground with 
the Middle East’s authoritarian rulers. 
It laid bare not only the weakness of the 
region’s secular authoritarian regimes, but 
also the potential for mobilisation of its 
Sunni Islamic movements. The various 
strands of the Muslim Brotherhood looked 
poised to be the crucial political forces in 
the Middle East. 
Erdoğan’s Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) is strongly Islamic-conservative 
as well. Its founding cadres were (and are) 
known for their ideological proximity to 
the Muslim Brothers. During the AKP’s long 
and uninterrupted reign (since 2002), the 
perception of state and nation within Turk-
ish society has changed. Memories of the 
size and might of the Ottoman Empire, 
which ruled the region for 500 years, have 
been revived. From about 2013 onwards, 
the AKP relativized the regime’s secularity. 
Its previously clear-cut focus on the EU and 
NATO took second place to the idea of 
Turkey dominating the Middle East. 
Globally, the signs were favourable for 
a revaluation of Turkey as well. The US was 
preparing to reduce its presence in the 
Middle East, which Turkey took as an invita-
tion to think about assuming a leading role 
itself. The only requirements seemed to 
be for Ankara to lend a hand to the Sunni-
Islamic popular movements in neighbour-
ing states and for the movements to assume 
the responsibilities of government there. 
… but meagre results 
It did not turn out that way. The Islamic 
Al-Nahda Party’s success at the urns in Tuni-
sia was only temporary, and Libya became 
mired in civil war. The decisive develop-
ments, however, occurred in Egypt and 
Syria. They not only put an end to Ankara’s 
dream of hegemony in the Middle East, 
but also alienated Turkey from the West. 
The Egyptian military’s coup d’état 
against the Muslim-Brotherhood govern-
ment on 7 March 2013 was the first setback 
with far-reaching consequences. Turkey 
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condemned as a betrayal of the ideals of 
democracy the fact that Western states, 
most notably the US, accepted the putsch 
and even continued to cooperate with the 
military government. For Erdoğan, this was 
also proof that the West consents to the 
overthrow of elected governments wher-
ever that sidelines the representatives of 
the Muslim masses. Was this not a good 
reason to fear that the West would also 
tolerate – or even welcome – the removal 
of his own government? After the putsch in 
Egypt, the view came to prevail in Ankara 
that the protests around Istanbul’s Gezi 
Park, which had just been violently put 
down, were essentially an attempted putsch 
by pro-Western forces. Since then, the gov-
ernment has resorted to this interpretation 
whenever it faces a political problem. 
Turkey broke with Syrian ruler Bashar 
al-Assad later than the US and European 
states did, but then it pushed for arming 
the Muslim opposition earlier and more 
energetically than they did. In 2013, differ-
ences emerged between Washington and 
Ankara over which parts of the Islamic 
opposition should be labelled jihadists 
and/or terrorists. In the US, these differ-
ences of opinion fanned criticism that 
had emerged some time earlier and fun-
damentally opposed Obama’s policy of 
cooperating with moderate Muslim move-
ments. This fuelled concerns in Ankara 
that the West wanted to damage the ruling 
party. 
Disagreement over the role of the Syrian 
Kurds was soon added to the mix. The Kurd-
ish militias had become the US’s most pow-
erful partner against IS. Ankara accused 
Washington of promoting terrorism. In 
turn, the US reproached Turkey with refus-
ing to provide active support for the war 
against IS for a long time; making light of 
the existence of jihadist cells in Turkey; 
and failing to prevent increasing numbers 
of so-called foreign fighters joining IS by 
establishing tighter border controls. Simul-
taneously there were growing protests 
in Europe against Ankara’s policy on the 
Kurds and on human rights. 
By early 2016, Turkey had backed itself 
into a hopeless corner. It had become the 
common adversary of states that represent 
antithetical interests in the Middle East. Its 
Syria policy had turned it into an opponent 
of the regimes in Damascus, Tehran and 
Moscow. Its conflict with Israel had not 
been settled yet. Allowing Iraqi Kurds to 
directly export their oil despite Baghdad’s 
opposition worsened Turkey’s relations 
with Iraq. Its relationship with Cairo had 
been at a low point ever since the military 
coup there. The fact that Riadh not only 
bailed out the putschists financially but 
also declared the Egyptian Muslim Brother-
hood a terrorist organisation put a strain 
on Turkey’s relations with Saudi Arabia and 
other Gulf States. 
It was in November 2015 that Ankara 
finally overstepped the mark. Turkish jets 
downed a Russian warplane that had vio-
lated Turkish airspace. Moscow imposed 
economic sanctions and closed Syrian air-
space for Turkish planes, causing great dif-
ficulty for the rebels supported by Ankara. 
Overthrowing Assad was now out of the 
question. At the same time, the risk grew 
that the Kurds might unite the territories 
they held in north-eastern and north-
western Syria, sealing Turkey off from the 
Middle East. 
A change in direction had become in-
evitable. In late June, Ankara ceased its 
demands that Israel lift its maritime 
blockade of Gaza, which until then had 
been Turkey’s condition for resuming 
diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv. In the 
same month, Erdoğan also apologised to 
Putin for the downing of the Russian jet. 
Radical Realism and 
Ideological Amnesia 
However painful the associated U-turn 
might be for the Turkish government, its 
conciliation with Russia has enabled it to 
make a radical shift in its Syria policy. This 
reorientation has probably been expressed 
most clearly in the joint declaration agreed 
by Russia, Iran and Turkey on 20 December 
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2016 in Moscow. In it, they affirm “their 
full respect for the sovereignty, independ-
ence, unity and territorial integrity of the 
Syrian Arab Republic as a multi-ethnic, 
multi-religious, democratic and secular 
state”. The three governments signalled 
their commitment to act as “guarantors of 
a prospective agreement” to be negotiated 
“between the Syrian government and the 
opposition” and stressed their determi-
nation to “fight jointly against IS and 
Al-Nusra”. 
All the goals of Turkey’s previous Syria 
policy have thus been reversed. Its ruler 
Assad is recognised as a negotiating part-
ner. By agreeing to a secular Syria, Ankara 
has let go of the idea of bringing the neigh-
bouring state under Muslim Brotherhood 
rule. And the Al-Nusra Front (now known 
as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham), which had been 
supported time and again by Turkey, has 
been ranked alongside IS as a terrorist orga-
nisation. All of this is likely to significantly 
lessen Ankara’s prestige with the Sunni 
Islamic opposition and thus deprive Turkey 
of its most important lever within Syria. 
The events of 5 December 2016 illustrate 
how bitter its U-turn must taste to Ankara. 
On that day, following heavy Russian and 
Syrian bombardment, Assad’s military 
began retaking Aleppo. Aleppo is not only 
Syria’s largest city, but also a Sunni-rebel 
stronghold and the centre of Turkish-Otto-
man heritage in Syria. On 5 December, 
Russia and China used their veto to prevent 
the UN Security Council from calling on 
the parties to the conflict to agree to an 
immediate ceasefire. And on the very day 
that this decisive bastion of Turkey’s Syria 
policy was recaptured with Russian assis-
tance, the Turkish Prime Minister Binali 
Yıldırım made his pilgrimage to Moscow 
where he hoped to get the continued sanc-
tions lifted, so as to reinstate visa-free travel 
for Turks, for instance. In Moscow, Yıldırım 
promised Russia close military and intel-
ligence cooperation. Only a few months 
earlier, Turkish newspapers close to the 
government were still claiming that Russia 
was waging a war on Muslims and Islam. 
Foreign Policy: 
From the Party to the State 
Syria has now entirely slipped beyond 
Turkey’s influence. Nothing is left of the 
successes of the first decade of this century 
when Ankara tied Syria to it with a plethora 
of agreements, reciprocal visa exemption, a 
free-trade deal, joint cabinet meetings and 
military and political cooperation. Syria was 
supposed to be Turkey’s gateway to the Arab 
world. That dream of Turkish hegemony 
over the Middle East is now over. The foreign 
policy pursued by the AKP, which centred 
on the dream, is being buried. 
The ruling party’s foreign policy is being 
replaced by the “old” foreign policy of the 
Turkish state. This is not shaped by grand 
visions, but by security concerns, primarily 
the fear of Kurdish separatism. Its top prior-
ities are, first, to prevent the Kurdish terri-
tories of Kobane in north-eastern and Afrin 
in north-western Syria from uniting and 
then to demolish the autonomous structures 
that have been set up there. Both circles 
close to the government and extreme na-
tionalists are now calling for the necessary 
operations to be launched against the towns 
of Kobane, Manbij and Afrin. 
So far, the West has not been supportive 
of such a policy. The US grants the Syrian 
Kurds too important a role in fighting IS, 
and it is probably too interested in holding 
the bridgeheads established there as well. 
Even Turkish commentators who are criti-
cal of their government assume that the US 
will not give up the lever in Syria that the 
Kurds represent, seeing that Syria will con-
tinue to be dominated by Russia and Iran. 
Hence Ankara is looking to Moscow. The 
incursion of Turkish troops into northern 
Syria as part of Operation Euphrates Shield 
– which is aimed at least as much against 
the Syrian Kurdish PYD as it is against IS – 
was only made possible by conciliation 
with Russia. Moscow de facto opened Syrian 
airspace for Turkish jets, and its tacit con-
sent ensured that Damascus responded to 
the Turkish intrusion only with verbal 
protests. 
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Ever Further from the West 
Turkey’s about-turn is its response to the 
end of the Arab Spring and the failure of its 
Middle East policy. However, the fact that 
this change in direction is taking the shape 
of a rapprochement with Moscow is pri-
marily a consequence of American policy. 
It will continue for as long as Washington’s 
stance on the Kurds remains unchanged. 
There are no signs that Turkey is shedding 
its fixation with the PKK and the Kurds as 
the supposedly biggest threat to Turkish 
statehood or that it is considering return-
ing to the negotiating table. If Turkey had 
been able to change its mindset and en-
visage political integration and partnership 
with the Kurds, it would have contacted the 
PYD while the peace negotiations with 
the PKK were still ongoing. Turkey would 
then have influenced the PKK through the 
PYD and tried to win over the Syrian Kurds 
as an additional force against Assad. 
But in Ankara’s current perception, US 
policy directly targets Turkey’s security 
interests. The Turkish government and 
press are doing everything in their power 
to anchor this image in the minds of the 
population. In late December 2016, Erdo-
ğan went so far as to claim he had proof 
that the US even provided assistance to IS – 
as long as it was fighting Turkey. And after 
the IS attack on an Istanbul nightclub on 
1 January 2017, the Turkish cabinet alleged 
that the attack was probably a reaction 
to the Russian-Turkish ceasefire for Syria, 
because it had marginalised the US on the 
Syrian issue. 
This conception manifests itself in Tur-
key’s policy on NATO and the EU. Whilst 
the Turkish government has assured NATO 
of its loyalty, it has also emphasised its 
determination to continue cooperating 
with Moscow in military and defence policy 
and consider purchasing Russian S400 anti-
ballistic missiles. Ankara and Moscow also 
intend to introduce a joint mechanism for 
military and intelligence cooperation. Turk-
ish think tanks have debated the pros and 
cons of remaining in NATO, and some 
clearly favour leaving. 
In November 2015 the Turkish President 
“threatened” the EU with holding a referen-
dum on breaking off the accession talks. 
That same month he declared – and not for 
the first time – that Turkey would be better 
off in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisa-
tion (SCO) than in the EU. 
Turkey is increasingly attractive to the 
SCO, and in particular Russia. Conversely, 
the SCO’s importance for Turkey is grow-
ing, especially for Erdoğan. When he first 
voiced the possibility of Turkey’s member-
ship in the SCO in January 2013, Russia was 
not yet militarily active in Syria, and Tur-
key seemed firmly anchored in the West. 
Since then, Ankara has become part of 
Russia’s strategy for the Middle East and an 
important lever for weakening the West. In 
early 2013, however, four months before 
the Gezi protests, the West did not yet view 
Erdoğan exclusively as a symbol of authori-
tarianism; Ankara was preparing to hold 
peace talks with the PKK; Erdoğan was not 
yet a president wanting to change the con-
stitution to shore up his own power; and 
he had not had to survive a putsch attempt. 
The relatively democratic Turkey of that 
time did not consider the SCO’s basic prin-
ciple – mutual non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of its member states – to 
be quite as essential for its government as 
today. 
In other words, current dynamics in 
Turkey’s foreign policy do not clearly 
indicate whether it will remain a part of 
the West’s security system. How about 
domestic policy? 
Unanswered questions about the 
attempted putsch 
Two topics currently define the front lines 
of Turkey’s domestic policy: the evaluation 
of the attempted coup d’état of 15 July 
2016, and the constitutional change being 
pushed through by the government with 
all its might. 
There is agreement both in the country 
and among political parties that the at-
tempted putsch was carried out by a net-
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work of officers that had got to know each 
other via the movement of the preacher 
Fethullah Gülen. However, that is the sum 
total of the consensus. The chairman of 
the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Kemal 
Kılıçdaroğlu, talks of a “controlled putsch 
attempt”, by the government. He is re-
ferring to news reports which suggest that 
the government saw the putsch attempt 
coming and allowed it to take place so as to 
legitimise its “counter-putsch” (in Kılıçda-
roğlu’s expression). One of the cornerstones 
of this thesis is that, eight hours before the 
putsch, a major in the Turkish armed forces 
personally sought out the secret service 
(controlled by Erdoğan’s closest confidante) 
and informed it that the initiative had been 
launched. The officer was presented to the 
head of the secret service, who then went to 
see the chief of general staff. However, the 
head of the secret service claims not to have 
informed the heads of state or government, 
nor did the chief of general staff give the 
commanders-in-chief of the services 
branches unequivocal orders. 
All this occurred despite the fact that, in 
those weeks, Ankara was expecting a coup 
attempt by officers close to Gülen. Some 
three months previously, a newspaper close 
to the government had published two 
articles by a journalist who boasted of good 
contacts in the secret service. He warned 
officers in the military who were close to 
Gülen that the secret service was aware of 
their plans and only waiting for them to 
become active and thus reveal the structure 
of their network. Another newspaper close 
to the government declared only three days 
before the putsch that around 600 officers 
close to Gülen would be removed from the 
army as part of the next round of promo-
tions in August. It is unclear whether the 
government did in fact deliberately allow 
the putsch to take place, thus accepting the 
deaths of around 240 people during the 
fighting on the night of the putsch. The of-
fices of a rightwing opposition newspaper 
that employs a journalist who had publicly 
defended this theory was attacked a few 
days later by masked rioters. The commis-
sion set up by the Turkish parliament to 
investigate the putsch was prevented by 
ruling-party delegates from questioning 
imprisoned generals or summoning the 
head of the secret service or the chief of 
general staff. Instead, the commission has 
been concentrating on the relationship 
between the Gülenists and the US. In a 
speech in the first week of January, Erdoğan 
did not baulk at repeating an obviously 
false report, just to put responsibility for 
the putsch back on Washington. 
Constitutional Change to 
Preserve the Status Quo 
Without the parliamentary faction of the 
extreme rightwing Nationalist Movement 
Party (MHP), the ruling party will not get 
its bill on constitutional change approved 
by parliament. The MHP chairman Devlet 
Bahçeli has justified his support by saying 
that, since President Erdoğan is overstep-
ping the competences granted to him 
under the existing constitution, the con-
stitution would have to be adapted to the 
actual circumstances. Justice Minister Bekir 
Bozdağ also favours the constitutional 
change to perpetuate the current situation. 
He readily admits that Erdoğan already has 
a decisive influence on the executive and 
legislative because of his high approval rate 
among the population. But since leaders as 
charismatic as Erdoğan were rare, he added, 
the conservatives needed a presidential 
system because only the runoff between 
two candidates provided by a presidential 
system could ensure that the successful 
candidate would always come from the 
conservative bloc, which enjoys a relative 
majority in Turkish society. This is needed 
to codify the conservatives’ predominance 
in the future. Opposition leader Kılıçda-
roğlu likewise regards the cementing of the 
current balance of power as the true goal 
of the constitutional change that is being 
sought, though his appraisal of it is diamet-
rically opposed. For him, the change is in-
tended to formally and legally turn the 
“counter-putsch” carried out by the govern-
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ment on 20 July when it declared a state of 
emergency (which has so far been extended 
twice) into the new normal; remove the di-
vision of powers; and finally do away with 
the already badly damaged state of law. 
The bill to change the constitution con-
firms the hopes of its supporters and thus 
also the fears of its opponents. If modified 
in line with the bill, the constitution would 
weaken the parliament vis-à-vis the presi-
dent. He could dissolve it at any time and 
set the date for new elections; nominate 
ministers, secretaries of state and the heads 
of all administrations by himself; declare a 
state of emergency; and, in that scenario, 
rule using emergency decrees. Parliament 
would lose the right to question the execu-
tive directly and could no longer block its 
policies by refusing to adopt the budget. 
Moreover, since the president could remain 
both a member and the chairman of his 
party, he would also be in a position to 
dominate the policies of the most powerful 
parliamentary party, which would give him 
significant influence over the legislative. And 
since the president and parliament together 
appoint around half of the judiciary, a 
president who is also party chairman could 
in future select half of all judges. 
The bill was adopted at its first and 
second readings in January. It will be put to 
a referendum at the earliest on 26 March, 
at the latest on 16 April. What is the popu-
lar mood on the topic? 
The attitude of the population 
According to a recent poll, only a fifth of 
the population feels well-informed about 
the content of the constitutional change. 
This might explain why different pollsters 
receive such different answers when asking 
whether those surveyed agree with or reject 
the bill. What is certain, however, is that 
there is broad agreement with the state of 
emergency being declared and extended: 
about two-thirds of those polled endorse it. 
Around two-thirds also trust the govern-
ment and its security policy. This closing 
of ranks shows that the government’s anti-
West rhetoric has been falling on fertile 
ground. Forty-four percent of those polled 
thus accept at face value the claims made 
by Erdoğan and his government that the 
West had a negative or even hostile attitude 
towards Turkey and that foreign countries 
(in the West) were ultimately responsible 
for all terrorist attacks in Turkey. About the 
same percentage would welcome breaking 
off the EU accession talks, and 87 percent 
agree with the rapprochement with Russia. 
Even before the attempted putsch, only 38 
percent considered a continued NATO 
membership to be necessary. That percent-
age has likely sunk further, given the wide-
spread suspicions that NATO had prior 
knowledge of the coup. Turkey is taking 
giant steps away from Europe in its domes-
tic policy as well. 
Customs Union and Red Lines 
And yet the EU remains by far the most 
important market for Turkish exports. 
Between 2012 and 2015, its share of Turkish 
exports rose from 39 to 44 percent. In 2015, 
57.6 percent of direct foreign investment in 
Turkey and two-thirds of all foreign holdings 
in Turkish firms came from EU countries. 
In November 2016, former Finance Minister 
Mehmet Şimşek, who is now one of the 
Prime Mininster’s deputies, warned that 
turning its back on the EU was demoting 
Turkey to a third-world country. His 
warning was triggered by the stagnation 
in domestic investment and the drop in 
foreign investment from 10.5 bn. US dollars 
in the first half of 2015 to 4.8 bn. in the 
same period in 2016. Because of its growing 
population and the entry into the labour 
market of baby-boom generations, Turkey 
has neither managed to raise its pro-capita 
income (on a US dollar basis) nor to reduce 
its unemployment rate, despite average 
annual growth of about 3.7 percent in the 
past few years. 
Economically speaking, neither of the 
great economic powers in the SCO, Russia 
or China, is an alternative to the EU for 
Turkey either currently or in the long term. 
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In 2015 Turkey posted a negative trade 
deficit with both Russia (minus 16.8 per-
cent) and China (minus 22.5 percent). 
From a strategic perspective, it is unclear 
how, without NATO backing, Turkey in-
tends to counter Russia’s power projection 
in the Black Sea, Caucasus and Middle East. 
Breaking with the West is therefore neither 
good economic nor good strategic sense. 
However, the West cannot rely on Ankara 
to share this view of Turkish interests. To 
keep Turkey part of West, the EU should 
make some concessions to Ankara, for 
instance on the upcoming negotiations on 
the customs union or the visa exemption 
for Turkish citizens. However, these con-
cessions must be linked to red lines, such 
as the re-introduction of the death penalty 
and torture. 
To be heard in Ankara, not just the EU 
but NATO as well must speak with one 
voice. In addition, NATO must extricate it-
self from the tight spot between Turks and 
Kurds in Syria into which Washington has 
manoeuvred it. 
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